Český finanční a účetní časopis 2006(1):150-162 | DOI: 10.18267/j.cfuc.134

Dopady kvalitativních změn v charakteru rizik na problém asymetrie informace na pojistných trzích

Eva Ducháčková1, Jaroslav Daňhel2
1 Doc. Ing. Eva Ducháčková, CSc. - docentka; Katedra bankovnictví a pojišťovnictví, Fakulta financí a účetnictví, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, nám. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3; <duchack@vse.cz>.
2 Prof. Ing. Jaroslav Daňhel, CSc. - vedoucí katedry, profesor; Katedra bankovnictví a pojišťovnictví, Fakulta financí a účetnictví, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, nám. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3; <danhel@vse.cz>.

The Nobel Prize award to scientists for thier theoretical contribution to analysis of markets with asymmetrical informations has reawakened debates on the behavior and decision-making of economic player under uncertainty. Becouse insurance is an classic example of such a situation, it is used to illustrate the cases of asymmetry, for the clients is supposed to know better his own exposure then the insurer. In fact, the client´s objective exposure apriori be cannot quantified from the point of wiew of exact sciencis and his decision is futher influenced by psychological and sociological faktors. The insurer is better equipped to make calculations, drawing on past experience and using the laws of statistics, furtermore, he takes antiselection on account. The final part of the paper explores the field of insurance market regulation in relation to the asymmetry of information between an insurance company and its client.

Keywords: Decision under uncertainty, Asymmetric information on insurance market, Consequences for supervisory.
JEL classification: D74, D81, D82, G22

Published: March 1, 2006  Show citation

ACS AIP APA ASA Harvard Chicago Chicago Notes IEEE ISO690 MLA NLM Turabian Vancouver
Ducháčková, E., & Daňhel, J. (2006). Dopady kvalitativních změn v charakteru rizik na problém asymetrie informace na pojistných trzích. Czech Financial and Accounting Journal, 2006(1), 150-162. doi: 10.18267/j.cfuc.134
Download citation
  • BibTeX (.bib)
  • Bookends (.ris)
  • EasyBib (.ris)
  • EndNote (.enw)
  • EndNote 8 (.xml)
  • ISI WoS (.isi)
  • Medlars (.medlars)
  • Mendeley (.ris)
  • MODS (.xml)
  • Papers (.ris)
  • RefWorks (.txt)
  • RefManager (.ris)
  • RIS (.ris)
  • MS Word (.xml)
  • Zotero (.ris)
    • Open full article

    References

    1. Daňhel, J. (1977): Pojištění z hlediska teorie optimálního rozhodování. Ekonomickomatematický obzor, 1977, roč. 13, č. 1, s. 92-103.
    2. Daňhel, J. (1990): Is Insurance Transfer of Risk? Pojistné rozpravy, 1990, roč. 0, svazek 3, s. 3-12.
    3. Luce, R. D. - Raiffa, H. (1957): Games and Decision. New York, John Wiley, 1957.
    4. Rothschild, M. - Stiglitz, J. (1976): Equilibrium in Competitive Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfekt Information. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1976, roč. 90, č. 4, s. 629-649. Go to original source...
    5. Stiglitz, J. (2001): Asymetrie informací a moci. Ekonom, 2001, roč. 48, č. 50, s. 22-23. Go to original source...

    This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0), which permits use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original publication is properly cited. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.


    Return to the content