Český finanční a účetní časopis 2026(2):4-14
Cost Optimization in Insurance under Information Asymmetry: Theoretical Approaches and Implications for Practice
This article examines the issue of cost optimization in the insurance industry under conditions of information asymmetry, with particular emphasis on moral hazard and adverse selection. The theoretical section reviews key economic models describing the behaviour of policyholders and insurers in the presence of information imbalances. The paper subsequently discusses selected instruments aimed at mitigating these inefficiencies, including screening and signalling mechanisms, behavioural approaches, regulatory interventions, and the application of data analytics. The findings suggest that effective cost management in insurance cannot be achieved without adequately addressing information asymmetries affecting both policyholders and insurers. The article proposes a conceptual framework that integrates microeconomic models with practical implications for cost management and risk selection mechanisms in the insurance sector.
Keywords: Information asymmetry, insurance, moral hazard, adverse selection, cost optimization, behavioral economics, algorithmic pricing
JEL classification: C82, D91, G22
Published: September 21, 2026 Show citation
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