Český finanční a účetní časopis 2007(2):6-16 | DOI: 10.18267/j.cfuc.217

Agency theory and Its Impact on Corporate Finance Theory

Petr Marek
Doc. Ing. Petr Marek, CSc. - docent; Katedra financí a oceňování podniku, Fakulta financí a účetnictví, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, nám. W. Churchilla 4, 130 67 Praha 3; <pema@vse.cz>.

Agency theory for the first time appeared in literature in 70s years at the works of Ross (1973), Jensen and Meckling (1976). Their starting points were transaction costs, asymmetric information, moral hazard and adverse selection. This theory gradually enforced not only in economic scientific disciplines but even in sociology and politics. From point of the view of corporate finance is the most important for the development of the discipline impact of agency costs on market value of firm. The theory has significant place in the explanation of optimal capital structure and dividend policy. Increasingly more and more representatives is appearing in the Czech scientific literature as well.

Keywords: Agency theory; Corporate finance theory; Agency costs.
JEL classification: G30

Published: June 1, 2007  Show citation

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Marek, P. (2007). Agency theory and Its Impact on Corporate Finance Theory. Czech Financial and Accounting Journal, 2007(2), 6-16. doi: 10.18267/j.cfuc.217
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